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PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE             
                                 THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 08-1748
_____________
ROBERT M. HOWLEY,
                         Appellee,
v.
 MELLON FINANCIAL CORPORATION; PLAN
ADMINISTRATORS OF THE MELLON FINANCIAL
CORPORATION DISPLACEMENT PROGRAM; MELLON
BANK 401K RETIREMENT SAVINGS PLAN; MELLON
FINANCIAL CORPORATION FLEXIBLE BENEFIT
PROGRAM; BENEFIT PLANS 1-10; JOHN DOES 1-10;
CORPORATIONS 1-10; AND MELLON FINANCIAL
CORPORATION DISPLACEMENT PROGRAM AND ITS
PLAN ADMINISTRATOR,
                            Appellants.
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
No. 06-cv-5992
District Judge: Judge Faith H. Hochberg
2Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 29, 2009
Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, and CHAGARES and
NYGAARD, Circuit Judges.
(Opinion filed: August 31, 2010)
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McKEE, Chief Judge.
Defendants Mellon Financial Corporation (“MFC”) and
various MFC-related entities appeal the district court’s order
granting Howley summary judgment on his claim for benefits
under MFC’s Displacement Program.  For the reasons that
follow, we will affirm.
I.
Howley was employed for many years by a subsidiary of
MFC known as “Buck Consultants.”  He was therefore eligible
for, and participated in, MFC’s Displacement Program.  That
program is a welfare benefit plan subject to the requirements and
protections of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-461.
The Displacement Program provides benefits to an
4employee of MFC or its subsidiaries whose “employment ceases
due to technological change or another business reason not
related to individual performance.”  J.A. 66.  These benefits
include severance pay, and perhaps more importantly, continued
eligibility to participate in and receive benefits under other MFC
benefit plans, including pension plans.
The Displacement Program states that it is “intended to
help displaced employees ‘bridge the gap’ between periods of
employment or retirement income.”  J.A. 73.  An employee is
therefore ineligible for Displacement Benefits if her/his
employment with an MFC subsidiary is terminated due to MFC’s
sale of that subsidiary to a company that provides comparable
employment.  This so-called “sale of business” exception applies
when:
the employee’s employment with [an MFC
subsidiary] is affected by [MFC’s] sale of a
business . . . to another employer where the terms
 Despite the use of the term “or” here, it is1
uncontested that these requirements are conjunctive rather
than disjunctive.
5
of the sale, contract or transfer provide for
employment of the employee by another employer
and [MFC] determines (such determination being
made in [MFC’s] sole discretion) that the position
to be provided to the affected employee:
--  Does not involve a significant change in
responsibilities from those assigned to the
employee immediately prior to the sale or transfer;
– Unless otherwise provided in the terms of the sale, contract or
transfer, is at a location within a thirty (30) mile radius of the
employee’s location immediately prior to the sale or transfer; or1
– Initially provides base salary and incentive compensation
opportunities which, in the aggregate, are reasonably similar to
those provided by the Participating [MFC] Company immediately
prior to the sale or transfer.
J.A. 67. 
Effective 11:59:59 p.m. on May 25, 2005, MFC sold Buck
to Affiliated Computer Systems, Inc. (“ACS”).  The contract of
sale provided that ACS would continue the employment of
6approximately 3,700 Buck employees, including Howley, and
that this employment would “initially:”
(i) not involve a significant change in
responsibilities from those assigned to the
particular US Transferred Employee immediately
prior to the transfer of such employment, (ii) offer
employment at a location within a 30 mile radius
from the principal work location of such US
Transferred Employee immediately prior to the
transfer of such employment, and (iii) provide base
salary and incentive compensation opportunities
which, in the aggregate, are reasonably similar to
those provided to such US Transferred Employee
immediately prior to the transfer.  
J.A. 723.  The next morning, May 26, 2005, at approximately
10:00 a.m., ACS informed Howley and ninety-nine other former
Buck employees that it was terminating their employment
effective June 2, 2005.  J.A. 219. 
Howley filed a claim for benefits under MFC’s
Displacement Program, but his claim was denied by the Program
Manager who concluded that the aforementioned sale of business
 The Program Manager also explained that the “snap shot”2
approach was reasonable because MFC needs to know on the
closing date who is entitled to Displacement Benefits in order to
“take the liabilities into account as part of the overall cost of the
transaction, notify affected employees, remove the affected
employees from the sale and continue them on [MFC’s] payroll
and benefits.”  J.A. 153-54.  
7
exception applied.  J.A. 141-55.  She explained that the exception
did not take into account the details of the job actually provided,
but instead turned on the details of the job to be provided, as set
forth in the contract of sale.  She stated:
the determination of whether the Sale of Business
Exception has been satisfied in a particular
instance must be made immediately prior to the
Closing; sometimes referred to as a “snap shot”
evaluation.  That is, [the] Sale of Business
Exception is satisfied if, immediately prior to the
Closing, the Buyer has agreed to continue
employment on the terms specified by the
Exception.2
J.A. 153.  Purportedly using this “snap shot” approach, the
Program Manager concluded that the sale of business exception
applied because Howley’s “job duties, pay and location were
 Under the terms of the plan, the Program Manager “is3
responsible for day-to-day administration of the Program, including
. . . determining eligibility, amount and duration of all Program
benefits.”  J.A. 66.  An adverse decision by the Program Manager
can be appealed to the Program Administrator, whose decision is
final.  J.A. 79.
8
unchanged immediately following the Closing.”  J.A. 154.
Howley appealed the Program Manager’s decision to the
Program Administrator, who affirmed the initial denial.   J.A. 36-3
51.  Like the Program Manager, the Program Administrator
stated that the details of the employment ACS actually provided
to Howley were “not relevant for purposes of Displacement
Program benefits.”  J.A. 48.  She explained that the Program
Manger had thus correctly applied the sale of business exception
on a “snap shot” basis, evaluating only “the Buyer’s
representations in the sale agreement,” and not taking into
consideration the realities of that employment thereafter.  J.A. 50.
Because Howley’s position at ACS “was for the same
9responsibilities, was at the same base salary and incentive
compensation level and within thirty (30) miles of the same
location as his position at [MFC] immediately prior to the
Closing Date of the sale,” Id., the Program Administrator agreed
that the exception applied, and that Howley was ineligible for
Displacement Benefits.
Howley brought suit in federal court, asserting claims for
benefits and for unlawful discrimination under ERISA, as well
as several related state law claims.  During discovery, it came to
light that certain Buck managers had helped plan his eventual
termination by ACS prior to the sale.  These managers provided
ACS with the names of 100 employees, including Howley, whom
they believed could be terminated immediately after the closing
without causing harm to the business.  Thus, these managers
knew, prior to the sale’s closing, that Howley would never be a
bona fide employee of ACS.  See J.A. 614.
 Because the district court granted Howley summary4
judgment on his claim for benefits, it dismissed all his other claims
as moot.  It noted, however, in response to Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment on Howley’s discrimination claim, that it
would have found a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
MFC discriminated against Howley for the purpose of interfering
with his rights under MFC’s Displacement Program and Buck’s
Pension Plan.  Defendants also challenge this portion of the district
court’s analysis on appeal.  Because we agree with the district court
that Howley is entitled to summary judgment on his benefits claim,
we need not address the discrimination claim.
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Upon completing discovery, Howley moved for partial
summary judgment on his claim for benefits, and Defendants
cross-moved for summary judgment on all claims.  The district
court granted Howley’s motion and denied Defendants’ motion.4
The court explained at the outset of its analysis that
because the plan language gave MFC discretion in interpreting
its terms and making benefit decisions, the court was required to
review its decision deferentially.  However, the court also
recognized that because MFC both sponsored and administrated
the Displacement Program, it operated under a conflict of
11
interest.  Therefore, in accordance with then-controlling
precedent, Pinto v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Co., 214
F.3d 377, 392 (3d Cir. 2000), the court applied a “heightened
arbitrary and capricious standard of review.”  J.A. 11.  
In addressing the merits of Howley’s claim for benefits,
the court relied heavily on the evidence, revealed during
discovery, that Buck had helped plan Howley’s termination prior
to the sale’s closing.  The district court accordingly reasoned that,
even under the “snap shot” approach used by the Program
Administrator, Howley had not received a bona fide offer of
employment.  Because “pre-planned immediate termination is not
a job offer that satisfies the requirements of the [sale of business
exception],” J.A. 14, the court held that MFC had abused its
discretion in denying Howley’s claim.  This appeal followed.
II.
The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §
12
1132(e) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over the district
court’s grant of summary judgment, applying the same standard
that the court should have applied.  Smathers v. Multi-Tool,
Inc./Multi-Plastics, Inc. Emp. Health & Welfare Plan, 298 F.3d
191, 194 (3d Cir. 2002).  Summary judgment is appropriate if,
viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party, there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(c)(2); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
Under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), a participant in an
ERISA benefit plan denied benefits by the plan’s administrator
may sue in federal court “to recover benefits due to him under the
terms of his plan.”  “[A] denial of benefits challenged under §
1132(a)(1)(B) is to be reviewed under a de novo standard unless
the benefit plan gives the administrator . . . discretionary
13
authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the
terms of the plan.”  Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489
U.S. 101, 115 (1989).  When the administrator has discretionary
authority, we review only for abuse of that discretion.  “Of
course, if a benefit plan gives discretion to an administrator . . .
who is operating under a conflict of interest, that conflict must be
weighed as a ‘facto[r] in determining whether there is an abuse
of discretion.’”  Id.  (quoting Restatement (Second) of Trusts §
187, Comment d (1959)).  
An administrator’s decision constitutes an abuse of
discretion only if it is “without reason, unsupported by
substantial evidence or erroneous as a matter of law.”  Abnathya
v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 2 F.3d 40, 45 (3d Cir. 1993).
III.
Defendants challenge the district court’s decision on two
primary grounds.  First, they argue that the district court erred by
 The district court cannot fairly be said to have “erred” in5
applying a heightened standard of review.  As we noted, when the
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applying a heightened standard of review.  Based on the Supreme
Court’s recent decision in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v.
Glenn, 128 S. Ct. 2343 (2008), they contend that an
administrator’s conflict of interest does not result in heightened
scrutiny of a decision to deny benefits.  Rather, it is just one
“factor” to be considered in evaluating whether that decision
constituted an abuse of discretion.  Second, Defendants argue
that when reviewing an administrator’s decision for abuse of
discretion, a court may only consider the evidence that was
before the administrator when it made the contested decision.
Accordingly, they insist that the district court erred by
considering the extra-record evidence that Buck managers helped
plan Howley’s termination prior to the sale to ACS.  Although
we agree that the district court “erred”  in both regards, it is5
district court granted Howley’s motion for summary judgment, our
decision in Pinto was controlling precedent.  Under Pinto, the
district court was required to elevate its standard of review because
of MFC’s conflict of interest. 
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nonetheless clear, for reasons we set forth below, that MFC
abused its discretion in denying Howley’s claim for benefits.
A.
Defendants’ first argument is plainly correct.  As we
recently discussed in Estate of Schwing v. Lilly Health Plan, prior
to the Supreme Court’s decision in Glenn, we had held that
Firestone required courts to adopt a “sliding scale” standard of
review, “in which the level of deference we accorded to a plan
administrator would change depending on the conflict or
conflicts of interest affecting plan administration.”  562 F.3d 522,
525 (3d Cir. 2009).  However, following Glenn, we
acknowledged:
our “sliding scale” approach is no longer valid.
16
Instead, courts reviewing the decisions of ERISA
plan administrators . . . in civil enforcement
actions brought pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §
1132(a)(1)(B) should apply a deferential abuse of
discretion standard of review across the board and
consider any conflict of interest as one of several
factors in considering whether the administrator .
. . abused its discretion.
Id. (emphasis added).  Therefore, as Defendants argue, MFC’s
conflict of interest does not alter the standard of review for
evaluating its decision to deny Howley benefits.  Rather, that
conflict is merely one factor to be considered in evaluating
whether MFC’s decision actually constituted an abuse of
discretion.
B.
Defendants next argue that the district court erred by
considering evidence outside of the administrative record.  It is
true that courts generally must base their review of an
administrator’s decision on the materials that were before the
 We have described the deferential standard of review that6
we use in the ERISA context as both an “arbitrary and capricious”
standard of review, and a review for “abuse of discretion.”  See
Estate of Schwing, 562 F.3d at 526 n.2.  We use these
characterizations interchangeably in this opinion.
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administrator when it made the challenged decision.  Materials
that the parties failed to put before the administrator are not
usually relevant to the inquiry of whether the administrator
abused its discretion.   Thus, under most circumstances, “the
record for arbitrary-and-capricious review of ERISA benefits
denial is the record made before the plan administrator, and
cannot be supplemented during litigation.”   Kosiba v. Merck &6
Co., 384 F.3d 58, 67 n.5 (3d Cir. 2004).  
However, this rule is not without exceptions.  A court may
certainly “consider evidence of potential biases and conflicts of
interest that is not found in the administrator’s record.”  Id.; see
also Burke v. Pitney Bowes Inc. Long-Term Disability Plan, 544
18
F.3d 1016, 1028 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he district court may
consider evidence outside the administrative record to decide the
nature, extent, and effect on the decision-making process of any
conflict of interest.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The
necessity for this exception is obvious.  A plan participant may
be unaware of information relating to an administrator’s conflict
until well after the administrative process has ended, and a
conflicted administrator, especially one whose decision-making
has been affected by that conflict, is not at all likely to volunteer
that information.  To allow an administrator the benefit of a
conflict merely because it managed to successfully keep that
conflict hidden during the administrative process would be
absurd.
Although we adopted this exception prior to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Glenn, it remains equally appropriate after
Glenn.  Glenn directs a court to consider a conflict of interest as
19
a factor in its analysis, and to afford that factor greater
importance, perhaps determinative importance, where the
evidence suggests a greater likelihood that it affected the decision
to deny benefits.  128 S.Ct. at 2351.  For this legal standard to be
meaningful, courts plainly must be willing to consider evidence
relating to “the nature, extent, and effect on the decision-making
process of any conflict of interest” revealed during the litigation
process.  Burke, 544 F.3d at 1028.
Here, the extra-record evidence considered by the district
court was certainly relevant to assessing the extent of MFC’s
conflict of interest, and by inference, the effect of that conflict on
its decision-making process.  This evidence shows that while
MFC was negotiating ACS’s continued employment of Buck
employees under terms that seemingly mirrored the requirements
of the sale of business exception, its subsidiary was helping ACS
plan the immediate termination of 100 of those employees.  This
20
arrangement would have financially benefitted MFC in two ways.
First, it allowed MFC to avoid paying Displacement Program
benefits to 100 Buck employees by making it appear that their
employment would continue uninterrupted at ACS.  Second, it
made the acquisition of Buck more appealing to ACS, because
ACS knew that it could immediately slash costs by eliminating
100 of the employees it had agreed to employ.  The existence of
such a scheme – seemingly perfectly orchestrated to ensure that
MFC would not have to pay, directly or indirectly, the cost of
certain promised benefits – is surely evidence that a reasonable
fact-finder could deem relevant to whether MFC’s conflict of
interest affected its decision to deny Howley’s claim.
Nonetheless, the district court afforded more weight to
this evidence than is appropriate when deciding a motion for
summary judgment.  See Nolan v. Heald Coll., 551 F.3d 1148,
1155 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that a court considering evidence
 Howley does not argue that MFC is responsible for the7
actions of Buck’s managers as a matter of law.  He only claims that
MFC was, in fact, the motivating force behind those actions. 
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outside of the administrative record because of its relevance to a
conflict of interest must still construe that evidence in favor of
the non-moving party for the purposes of summary judgment).
It is uncontested that Buck’s managers colluded with ACS to
plan Howley’s termination in advance of the sale.  However, it is
not clear from the record why they did so, or at whose behest.
Moreover, MFC has denied any knowledge of, or involvement in,
its subsidiary’s actions.  Accordingly, there is a genuine issue of
material fact regarding MFC’s role in this duplicity.  The district
court erred in resolving this dispute in Howley’s favor at this
stage in the proceedings.   7
Under these circumstances, we would normally remand so
that the district court could evaluate Howley’s claim in the first
22
instance using these correct legal standards.  However,
notwithstanding the district court’s errors, we think it clear on
this record that the denial of Howley’s claim for benefits
constituted an abuse of discretion.  See Fairview Twp. v. EPA,
773 F.2d 517, 525 n.15 (3d Cir. 1985) (“It is well settled that we
[can] affirm the district court on any basis which finds support in
the record.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Accordingly,
remand would only waste judicial resources and delay a decision
on the merits.
C.
In determining whether an administrator’s interpretation
of a plan is reasonable, we consider the following factors:
(1) whether the interpretation is consistent with the
goals of the Plan; (2) whether it renders any
language in the Plan meaningless or internally
inconsistent; (3) whether it conflicts with the
substantive or procedural requirements of the
ERISA statute; (4) whether the [relevant entities
have] interpreted the provision at issue
23
consistently; and (5) whether the interpretation is
contrary to the clear language of the Plan.
Moench v. Robertson, 62 F.3d 553, 566 (3d Cir. 1995).
Construing all facts in Defendants favor, and thus affording
negligible weight to MFC’s conflict of interest, we conclude that
its decision still fails by a majority of these measures, and was an
abuse of its discretion.
As we have discussed, MFC’s Displacement Program is
designed to help “displaced employees ‘bridge the gap’ between
periods of employment or retirement income.”  J.A. 73.  When
MFC sells a subsidiary, but ensures that the subsidiary’s
employees will be provided comparable employment by the
buyer, there is no gap to bridge.  Consequently, the Program does
not pay those employees benefits.  Consistent with this
underlying purpose, the sale of business exception has two
primary requirements: (1) the contract of sale must “provide for
24
employment of the employee by another employer,” and (2) MFC
must determine that the position “to be provided to the affected
employee” is comparable to the position the employee held
before the sale, and in particular, that it “[i]nitially provides base
salary and incentive compensation opportunities which, in the
aggregate, are reasonably similar to” those that were provided by
the MFC subsidiary.  J.A. 67.
For our purposes here, the crux of this language is the
word “initially,” as used to define when employment is sufficient
to satisfy the sale of business exception.  “Initially” is a less than
precise word, but, at minimum, it connotes some temporal
requirement.  Therefore, consistent with this language,
employment satisfies the sale of business exception only if it
continues for some amount of time.  Furthermore, that amount of
time must be reasonable in light of the stated purpose of the
Displacement Program.  See Keating v. Whitmore Mfg. Co., 186
 Defendants argue that the plan language requires this8
prospective approach.  As we have explained, the sale of business
exception applies when the terms of the contract of sale “provide
for employment of the employee by another employer,” and MFC
determines that the “position to be provided” offers initially
comparable employment.  J.A. 67.  We agree that the “snap shot”
approach in and of itself is reasonable given this language.
We note, however, that neither the Program Manager nor
the Program Administrator stated in making their decisions that
they used the “snap shot” approach because it was required by the
plan language.  Instead, they defended that choice as reasonable
25
F.3d 418, 422 (3d Cir. 1999) (an administrator’s decision should
not “controvert the . . . purpose of the Plan.”).  Again, the sale of
business exception exists because employees provided
comparable employment by a buyer have no gap in employment
that they need to bridge.  This is plainly not true, however, when
the employment provided is de minimis.
Defendants spend the majority of their energy on appeal
defending their use of the “snap shot” approach, through which
they were able to ignore the fact that the employment provided
to Howley by ACS was de minimis.   However, it is not that8
because MFC needed to know its liabilities with finality prior to a
sale’s closing.  The making of benefit decisions by an ERISA
administrator based on what is best for the sponsor of the plan is a
flagrant violation of that administrator’s fiduciary duty to make
such decisions “solely in the interest of the [plan’s] participants
and beneficiaries.”  Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 506
(1996) (quoting ERISA § 404(a)).
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approach in and of itself, but rather the Administrator’s
unreasonable wielding of it, with which we are concerned.
The Program Administrator explained that she evaluated
the applicability of the sale of business exception based solely on
“the Buyer’s representations in the sale agreement.”  J.A. 50.
She concluded that those representations satisfied the exception
because, consistent with the exception’s requirements, ACS
agreed to “initially” provide comparable employment to Howley
and the other Buck employees.  However, the contract of sale
included no definition of the term “initially,” and imposed no
other temporal requirement that ACS’s employment of these
persons need satisfy.  Although ACS made other firm
 Notably, one of these commitments was ACS’s agreement9
that it would provide severance pay equivalent to that which the
employee would have received under the Displacement Program
(which includes base salary but excludes incentive compensation,
J.A. 69) to any transferred employee whom it failed to employ for
three months following the sale.  J.A. 725.  However, ACS did not
commit to continue providing any such employees with the other
benefits that the Displacement Program deems equally important
for providing a bridge between jobs.  As we have noted, one such
benefit is the ability to continue participation in pension plans.  It is
uncontested that Howley was eleven months from qualifying for
early retirement under Buck’s Pension Plan when he was
transferred, and that had he been found eligible for Displacement
Benefits, he would have been able to retire under that plan.  J.A. 2.
Although these facts raise troubling inferences, we do not
consider them for purposes of summary judgment review.  Rather,
we note only the uncontested facts that in the contract of sale, MFC
failed to require ACS to commit to provide employment to
transferred employees for a reasonable length (or any length) of
time, or in the alternative, to provide all Displacement Program
benefits to those employees in MFC’s stead.
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commitments in the contract of sale, promising to take certain
actions for specified periods of times, it did not do so with regard
to continuing the employment of Howley and the other
transferred employees.  9
The Administrator concluded that ACS’s entirely
 Defendants emphasize that the contract of sale uses the10
word “initially” just as the Displacement Program does.  This
28
undefined commitment was sufficient to make applicable the sale
of business exception.  In so doing, she nullified the exception’s
temporal requirement, and thereby rendered the term “initially,”
as used in the plan language, meaningless.  Under the
administrator’s approach, so long as a contract of sale includes
a promise, no matter how illusory, to continue an employee’s
employment, that employee is ineligible for Displacement
Program benefits.  The buyer is thus free to terminate that
employee one week, one day, or one hour (or even one minute)
after completion of the sale.  Crediting such empty promises is
entirely unreasonable in light of the purpose of the Displacement
Program.  It leads directly to situations such as the one that arose
here, permitting MFC to wash its hands of an employee on the
date of sale, and the buyer to do so just a few days later.10
“copying and pasting” of plan language is insufficient.  As we have
explained, the contract of sale left that term undefined, and any
reasonable interpretation of the Program must include a mechanism
for giving that provision meaning.  A retrospective evaluation of
whether a buyer had “initially” provided comparable employment
would certainly suffice.  However, since Defendants insist that they
cannot use a retrospective approach, the word must derive some
meaning in the contract of sale itself, such as to not negate the
provision and make its commitment illusory, as happened here. 
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Use of a “snap shot” approach does not relieve the
Administrator of her duty to ascertain whether the temporal
requirement of the sale of business exception is satisfied.  Thus,
the Administrator’s review of the “buyer’s representations” in the
contract of sale must be more than a rubber stamp of hollow
words, and must take into account the reality of what the buyer
has actually committed to do.  For a buyer’s representations to
satisfy the sale of business exception, the buyer must commit to
continue the employment of transferred employees for some
period of time that is reasonable in light of the plan’s purpose (or,
in the alternative, to provide all Displacement Program benefits
30
in MFC’s stead, if employment is not provided for a reasonable
length of time).
Notably, the Administrator did at certain times appear to
treat the sale of business exception as containing a temporal
requirement.  However, she concluded that this requirement was
satisfied because ACS actually did provide Howley comparable
employment “immediately after” the sale of Buck to ACS.  J.A.
48; see also J.A. 154 (The Program Manager concluded that
because Howley’s “job duties, pay and location were unchanged
immediately following the Closing, the conditions of the Sale of
Business Exception were satisfied.” (emphasis added)).  This is,
of course, inconsistent with the Administrator’s emphatic
insistence that she could only look to the buyer’s representations
in the contract of sale. 
Additionally, though, this interpretation of what satisfies
the temporal requirement is as unreasonable as her interpretation
31
nullifying that requirement.  Given the purpose of the Program,
“initially” must mean more than “immediately after” or
“immediately following.”  Comparable employment
“immediately following” displacement tells the Administrator
nothing about whether that employee needs the “bridge” the
Displacement Program is supposed to provide.  If an employee
is ineligible for benefits simply because s/he is momentarily
employed after a sale, the Displacement Program offers
employees a bridge to nowhere.  This is flatly inconsistent with
the stated purpose of the plan.
Defendants insist that since they voluntarily offer these
benefits, they are free to structure the terms and requirements for
receiving them as they see fit, and we agree.  It is clear (and
uncontested) that MFC had no obligation to offer these benefits.
However, the keystone of ERISA’s protections is that when
employers choose to offer benefits (and reap the rewards of doing
32
so), they must administer those benefits in a manner that is
reasonable.  Administering benefits in a way that controverts a
plan’s stated purpose, renders plan language meaningless, and
creates benefits that can exist only on paper, is unreasonable.  In
these circumstances, ERISA requires that we provide a remedy.
IV.
Because we agree that MFC abused its discretion in
denying Howley’s claim for benefits under its Displacement
Program, we will affirm the district court’s order granting
Howley summary judgment on his claim pursuant to 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(a)(1)(B). 
